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Legal Scholarship for Judges
A B ST R ACT. This Feature examines the role of legal scholarship in judicial decision making. It
first provides a historical snapshot of U.S. legal scholarship, noting that the advent of legal real-
ism and other academic schools of thought may have contributed to a gap between legal scholar-
ship and judicial practice. The Feature then conducts an empirical survey of recent citations to
legal scholarship on the Seventh Circuit and concludes that most citations were on points of legal
doctrine rather than broad legal theory. While legal scholarship could well serve purposes other
than influencing judges -such as introducing new ideas, helping to shift norms, and subtly af-
fecting the development of the law- the Feature draws attention to the disconnect between the
bulk of legal scholarship and the judicial decision-making process..
A U T H OR. Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer in
Law, The University of Chicago Law School. I appreciate very much the assistance of Brett
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INTRODUCTION
Long before Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. startled the legal academy in
2011 by characterizing legal scholarship as something concerned with "the in-
fluence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in eighteenth century
Bulgaria or something,"' I had worried from time to time about the focus, the
utility, and the influence of the outpouring of written work that emanates each
year from America's two hundred plus law schools. Legal scholarship, howev-
er, is not a monolith: it is produced by a great variety of writers, it is addressed
to a number of distinct audiences, and it reflects a wide range of goals. I do not
want to live in a world where there is no place for the scholar who specializes in
Immanuel Kant, but at the same time, that scholar must recognize that a busy
federal judge or Justice is quite unlikely to read a word she has written. Wheth-
er the latter fact is regrettable is one of the points that this Feature covers. Be-
fore doing so, however, it takes a broader look at the trends in legal scholarship
over the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. It then takes a more per-
sonal turn to address the ways in which I seem to be using legal scholarship. In
short, there are some types of articles or books that I systematically push to the
back of my desk and eventually discard; others I skim quickly to see if the au-
thor is making an interesting point; and a small number I read carefully, either
for my own edification or to cite in an opinion.
In order to set the stage, I begin with a brief reminder of the two threads
that make up our story: one concerns legal scholarship in the United States,
beginning for convenience in the nineteenth century, and the other concerns
legal education and the bar. This story shows that, in contrast to the general
experience in Europe, we have always had at least two, and maybe three, paral-
lel legal professions in the United States: the legal academy, the practitioners,
and the judiciary. From the outside, these may seem to be all of a piece, but for
insiders, there are sharp differences among them. Consider, for instance, the
fact that one of the worst things a law school hiring committee might say about
a candidate for a tenure-track position is that her written work "merely" re-
views "what the law is" and is directed to a practitioner audience. By the same
token, one withering criticism a young associate might receive from a senior
partner about a draft memorandum or brief is that it is "too academic." There
is a rift here, to be sure, and most state and federal judges probably fall on the
practitioner side of that rift. That rift may account, in no small part, for the re-
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ception that the work of the legal academy receives among judges and practi-
tioners.
After this quick look at the distinctive path legal scholarship has taken, I
will jump forward to a look at what the Seventh Circuit has been doing with
legal scholarship over the last several years. Others have conducted similar
studies,' and so mine is intended only to add to the body of work that has al-
ready been done. There is one caveat, however, that must be acknowledged,
even if it is hard to know what to do with it. Scholarship plays both a visible
and an invisible role in judicial decision making. The visible role of scholarship
is relatively easy to study: how many articles are cited in judicial opinions, and
what type of article seems to have the greatest impact? The invisible role of
scholarship - the ways in which scholarship introduces new ideas, helps to shift
norms, and subtly affects the development of the law -is more difficult if not
impossible to evaluate. The warning here relates to the way in which judicial
opinions are produced in today's world (which for convenience we may date
from the mid-196os): who is writing the opinion drafts, who is including the
citation to the article, and who actually read the article? If you are thinking that
it might not have been the judge, you are correct. Law clerks write a very large
number of first drafts, and they are the ones who propose citations to support
the result in the opinion. Citations to the Constitution, to statutes, and to regu-
lations are easy for the judge to check; so are citations to judicial opinions. But
some citations to articles may appear without much judicial oversight (though
this is certainly not inevitable-some judges furnish their own citations, and
many, if not most, judges who do not write their own first drafts nonetheless
review carefully whatever the law clerk has submitted). I have no proposal that
would help scholars to distinguish between "real" citations to scholarship (that
is, citations to articles that the judge herself read and found useful for resolving
the problem at hand) and "filler" citations to scholarship. Nevertheless, the dif-
ference is there, and it means that the data should be treated with some cau-
tion.
2. See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the Supreme
Court's Use of Legal Scholarship, io6 Nw. U. L. REV. 995 (2012); David L. Schwartz & Lee
Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts ofAppeals: An Empirical Study,
96 CORNELLL. REV. 1345 (2011).
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I. AN HISTORICAL SNAPSHOT OF U.S. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
A. Academic Legal Scholarship
The idea of a body of scholarship devoted to law came slowly to the United
States. During the Colonial period, the Revolutionary period, and the early
years under initially the Articles of Confederation and later the Constitution,
law per se was not an academic subject. When Thomas Jefferson decided to
read law, he studied the leading legal treatise of the time, Sir Edward Coke's
Institutes, a four-volume (and reportedly tedious) treatise, along with Coke's
Reports of leading cases.3 He read these materials, along with Matthew Bacon's
New Abridgement of the Law, under the tutelage of George Wythe,4 and he was
then ready to go to work. Such colleges and universities as there were during
that period in the United States offered neither undergraduate nor graduate
degrees in law. Not until 1793 did William & Mary College grant its first
Bachelor of Law degree (an L.B.),5 and not until 1817 did Harvard create the
first systematic university-based law program,6 under which the degree of
L.L.B. was awarded. 7
Academic law as an independent subject was slow to catch on. Indeed,
throughout the nineteenth century there was a debate that would sound famil-
iar to modern ears: should universities offer essentially a vocational degree in
law, alongside their more elevated subjects such as philosophy, mathematics,
religion, and the study of ancient languages, or should universities treat law as
part of liberal, philosophic, or scientific studies ?8 The prevailing view appears
to have been the latter. As of 19oo, most states did not require a university edu-
cation to become a lawyer, and most practitioners had not attended either col-
3. See R.B. BERNSTEIN, THOMAS JEFFERSON 5-6 (2003); see also GRIFFIN B. BELL, Jefferson the
Lawyer: The Notion of Natural Rights, in FOOTNOTES TO HISTORY: A PRIMER ON THE AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL CHARACTER 28-29 (John P. Cole ed., 2008). Bell reports that Jefferson later
read Blackstone's Commentaries, but that this work (which played such a major role for
countless American lawyers) had not yet appeared when he was first learning the law. Id.
4. See Mark T. Flahive, The Origins of the American Law School, 64 A.B.A. J. 1868, 1876 (1978).
s. See Commemoration: William H. Cabell, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 573, 573 (1993).
6. See HARVARD LAW SCH. ASS'N, THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL:
1817-1917, at 3-4 (1918).
7. Michael E. Gehringer, Questions and Answers, 72 LAw LIBR. J. 152, 154 (1979).
8. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 472 (3d ed. 2005) ("In the
history of legal education, two paired sets of principles were constantly in battle. A principle
of vocational training struggled against a principle of scientific training. At the same time, a
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lege or law school.9 It was, however, common for states to require an appren-
ticeship with a member of the bar as a condition to admission.1" Old practices
died slowly: Justice Robert H. Jackson, who sat on the U.S. Supreme Court
from July 1941 through August 1954, was the last-appointed Justice never to
have graduated from law school." Even today, a handful of states permit peo-
ple who have not completed law school to sit for the bar, although this is quite
unusual and not likely to make a comeback.12
Change in legal education, however, was on the way. In 1870, Christopher
Columbus Langdell was appointed to be dean of the then-three-person faculty
of the Harvard Law School. 3 That same year, he inaugurated the case method
of teaching, and one is tempted to say that the rest has been history. Langdell,
however, was distinctive less for his theories of law than for his pedagogy. Like
most professors in the nineteenth century, he believed that there were certain
rules of law, and that these rules could and should be learned by students. He
merely thought that law, like other "sciences," was better taught through the
use of primary materials than through lectures.
The real radical to come along was Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who pub-
lished The Common Law in 1881 and launched the movement that later became
known as Legal Realism. Holmes famously began his book with the observa-
tion that "[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."' 4 He
meant not just that the life of the law was not logic; it also was not science, or
God-given natural rules, or reason. This became clear when, in his lecture The
Path of the Law, he argued that there is no basis in reason, or science, or other
external sources, for deciding what the proper rule of law is for any given situa-
tion. 5 Try as one might, it is impossible to delete the element of human judg-
ment and reasoning from the articulation of legal rules.
Writing as he did during a time when science was challenging the most
fundamental assumptions, Holmes may simply have been to law what other
9. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 185OS TO THE
198os, at 24 (1983) ("The vast majority of the legal profession until the turn of the century
still experienced only on-the-job legal education.").
1o. Id. at 25.
ii. TIMOTHYL. HALL, SUPREME COURTJUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 327 (2001).
12. See Sean Patrick Farrell, The Lawyer's Apprentice: How To Learn the Law Without Law School,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.corm/2o14/o8/o3/education/edlife/how-to
-learn-the-law-without-law-school.html [http ://perma.cc/KXX8-7E32].
13. See Bruce A. Kimball, Christopher Langdell: The Case of an 'Abomination' in Teaching Practice,
THOUGHT & ACTION, Summer 2004, at 23, 27.
14. OLIvERWENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (John Harvard Library 2009) (1881).
is. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, lo HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897).
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giants were to other fields.16 Charles Darwin had published The Origin of Spe-
cies in 1859;'7 Louis Pasteur disproved the theory of spontaneous generation in
1862;,8 in the last decades of the nineteenth century, Thomas Edison revolu-
tionized electric light, sound recordings, and motion pictures; '9 Guglielmo
Marconi invented wireless telegraphy in the 189os;'0 and at the same time Ma-
rie and Pierre Curie discovered and named radioactivity.21 It would have been
surprising if law had not in some manner reflected the same creativity, innova-
tiveness, and humanistic spirit.
For law, however, there were institutional consequences implicit in the idea
that law is a human creation and that judges in particular have a role in its de-
velopment. The Framers of the United States Constitution had adopted a gov-
ernment in which basic powers were separated, subject to carefully drawn
checks and balances. The simplistic theory has the legislative branch creating
the laws, the executive branch enforcing the laws, and the judicial branch ap-
plying the laws to cases properly brought before it. But what happens when the
legislative branch has consciously delegated authority to promulgate specific
rules and regulations under the umbrella of a general statute? What is a judge
to do when the law is not clear and some blanks remain? In a world where law
was pre-existing and determinate, the judge's job was to search through the
authorities until he found the answer. But if research is inherently incapable of
furnishing a definitive answer, to what should a judge turn?
One answer was furnished by the Legal Realists, who took the position that
law is not independent of public policy or social interest. To the contrary, they
said, law reflects the policy preferences of society as a whole, and of judges in
particular.' Taken to its extreme, Legal Realism postulates that judges do not
16. Seegenerally Louis MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001) (discussing American intellec-
tual history after the Civil War, focusing in particular on Oliver Wendell Holmes, William
James, Charles S. Peirce, and John Dewey, and touching on scientific developments of the
time).
17. CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION, OR THE
PRESERVATION OF FAVOURED RACES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE (Jim Endersby ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 2009) (1859).
18. See Nils Roll-Hansen, Experimental Method and Spontaneous Generation: The Controversy Be-
tween Pasteur and Pouchet, 1859-64, 34J. HIST. MED. &ALLIED SCI. 273, 286-87 (1979).
19. See JILL JONNES, EMPIRES OF LIGHT: EDISON, TESLA, WESTINGHOUSE, AND THE RACE TO
ELECTRIFY THE WORLD (2004).
20. See SUNGOOK HONG, WIRELESS: FROM MARCONI'S BLACK-Box TO THE AUDION 1 (2001).
21. See Nancy Froman, Marie and Pierre Curie and the Discovery of Polonium and Radium,
NOBELPRZE.ORG (Dec. 1 1996), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/themes/physics
/curie [http://perma.cc/7NXR-VLZ4].
22. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931).
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decide cases based on pre-existing laws, but instead inevitably inject their own
policy views into each matter before them.23 If the Legal Realists were accurate-
ly describing the judicial process, then their school calls into question the as-
sumption of the Framers that it is possible to separate the legislative and judi-
cial functions. It also throws a shadow over the idea, famously articulated by
Chief Justice John Marshall, that "[i] t is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.""4 Why should unelected judges
with tenure of office "during good behavior" have this power, if they are not
tethered to law, understood as a set of rules that democratic institutions have
specified in advance? The Realists had no good answer to this question. That is
probably because it is not a very good question. By assuming away all of the
complexity of both the lawmaking and the law-application process, the Realists
had created a world in which the rule of law itself was impossible-a world
where judges could and would exercise arbitrary power.
Predictably, other schools of thought came along, some of which chal-
lenged the Realists and others of which pushed their thinking further. Among
the former is the Legal Process School of the 195os and 196os, which tried to
find a middle ground between the legal formalism of the pre-Holmes period
and the nihilism of Legal Realism. Its adherents included scholars such as Her-
bert Wechsler, Henry Hart, Albert Sacks, Lon Fuller, John Hart Ely, and Alex-
ander Bickel, all of whom emphasized the constraints on courts imposed by the
institutional structure within which they operate.2" The rule of law could be re-
spected in such a setting, despite the rejection of the notion of "ultimate" truth
in natural law, because the governed have notice of the rules under which they
must live, an opportunity to contest them in a fair hearing, and meaningful
remedies.26 Finally, both legal process advocates and later scholars, including
Ronald Dworkin, worked to articulate a way in which law would operate neu-
trally for and against all persons.27
Legal pragmatism is another approach that attempts to connect law with
the real world in a way that constrains judicial choice while at the same time
acknowledging the inevitability of case-by-case judgment. Its most prominent
proponent is Judge Richard A. Posner, a judge of the Court of Appeals for the
23. See, e.g., id. at 1237 (noting that realists exhibit "a distrust of the theory that traditional pre-
scriptive rule-formulations are the heavily operative factor in producing court decisions").
24. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
2S. See generally Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 6o (1993).
26. Id. at 608-09, 620-28.
27. See Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism and Justice, in RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
192 (1985); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 1 (1959).
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Seventh Circuit and a leading public intellectual.28 Judge Posner's version of
legal pragmatism grows out of his lifelong study of law and economics, but it
ranges more broadly than many might think. Law and Society is another post-
Realist philosophy that seeks to find room for legitimate judicial action not-
withstanding the lack of clear answers in positive law.29
On the other side of the coin, Legal Realism spawned the family of Critical
Studies schools, including Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory, Critical
Gender Theory, and others. It would be impossible to describe each of these
approaches fully, but in brief they reject the idea that legal doctrine has any
content independent of the social realities against which it operates (including,
for example, liberal theory, racial realities, and gendered expectations).3" Un-
less one is willing, in a leap of faith, to delegate decision-making power to ran-
dom persons with the title "judge," it is hard to see where the judiciary fits into
these schools of thought or what a judge persuaded by something in the litera-
ture is to do. This may be one reason why references to these bodies of litera-
ture are vanishingly scarce in judicial opinions.
Scholarship about the way judges think and what influences their decisions
has, until recently, developed without much input from the judges themselves.
Perhaps this is why some of the theories advanced -Realism, Critical Studies -
seem incompatible with principled judicial decision making, if principled judi-
cial decision making requires adherence to democratically legitimate substan-
tive laws. This left judges who wanted or needed to consult materials beyond
earlier cases and statutory or constitutional texts with a dearth of available
sources. As the next Part shows, other (primarily non-academic) organizations
began to fill that vacuum.
B. Another Kind of Legal Scholarship
At the same time as the legal academy was wrestling with these various
schools of thought, another source of legal scholarship was developing. It is
epitomized by the American Law Institute (Al), "founded in 1923 following a
study conducted by a group of prominent American judges, lawyers, and
28. See, e.g., RIcHAD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003); Richard A. Pos-
ner, What Has Pragmatism To Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1653 (199o); Michael Sullivan &
Daniel J. Solove, Can Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard Posner and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE
L.J. 687, 688 (2003) (reviewing POSNER, supra) ("For well over a decade, Posner has been
the leading proponent of legal pragmatism.").
29. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763
(1986).
30. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO &JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
(2001); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
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teachers known as the 'Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Or-
ganization for the Improvement of the Law.".'3 Among the ALI's founding
members were Chief Justice and former President William Howard Taft, fu-
ture Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, and former Secretary of State Elihu
Root; Judges Benjamin Cardozo and Learned Hand were among its early lead-
ers.32 The ALI's stated goal was to "address uncertainty in the law through a
restatement of basic legal subjects that would tell judges and lawyers what the
law was."33 And indeed that is what the ALl has done through its now ninety-
two-year history. Note the contrast between the notion that it is possible to
state "what the law is" and the intellectual movements that were taking place
during the 1920s and 1930s. The membership of the ALI draws from all three
branches of the legal profession: bench, bar, and academy, but its Restate-
ments of the Law and Principles of the Law are primarily addressed to courts.
There is now a considerable body of work published under the ALI's auspices,
but it is a different sort of legal scholarship than the articles and books that are
typically written by legal academics. The U.S. Supreme Court justices, their
state court counterparts, and practicing lawyers alike look to the Restatements
for guidance when a new legal problem comes up, and the Restatements are
cited regularly in judicial opinions. 4
Another source of legal commentary comes from the many bar associations
and providers of continuing legal education around the country. Some sponsor
regular journals, such as the American Bar Association Section of Litigation's
journal Litigation, or the Section of Antitrust Law's Antitrust Law Journal, while
others publish whenever they sponsor a program. These publications can be
very useful to busy lawyers, but they are not generally recognized in the legal
academy as "real" legal scholarship, and they are not what I am discussing in
this Feature.
One might ask, as Chief Justice Roberts did, whether the output from the
academy has become so removed from the legal issues our society faces that it
has lost its particular relevance to the legal profession. (I say "particular" rele-
vance in recognition of the fact that good philosophy, or social science, or liter-
ature has general relevance and importance. Even so, such general works do
not aspire to - and normally do not - suggest a good way to navigate the com-




34. See, e.g., Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. L. REV. 247, 249 (2007)
("Courts rely on Restatements in the same manner as treatises, as impartial, scholarly re-
views and criticisms of the law as it is or, in some cases, as it should be. In that sense, they
can be an important influence on state court decisions.").
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plexities of, for example, the Clean Air Act, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, or complex bankruptcy preferences.) There
are reasons to encourage law schools and legal scholars to return to the fold
and to realize that law itself is eminently worthy of serious study. Good work
does not need to be of the "Law and" variety, in the words of the late professor
Arthur Leff,3" nor is it the case that people are not qualified to join the legal
academy unless they have not only a law degree but also a Ph.D. in another ar-
ea. 6 The ALl has launched a project to encourage serious legal research
through its Young Scholars Medal.37 Law schools would do well to find more
ways to encourage both theoretical and empirical work in law-work that
would then be published in mainstream law journals and stand some chance of
helping all participants in the system understand better what is on the books,
what consequences (intended or unintended) the law in question has had, and
what improvements might be made.
C. Legal Scholarship Today
Before turning to a look at the legal scholarship that is presently making its
way into Seventh Circuit opinions, I will close this part of the Feature with a
few general questions and some general answers. The questions are these:
" Who is writing?
" Who is publishing?
" Who is the intended audience?
* How do written works reach that audience?
Here are my answers:
* Everyone is writing-lawyers, legal academics, other academics,
journalists, and bloggers.
35. Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978).
36. Cf Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Labor Market for New Law Professors, 11 J. EM-
PIRiCA LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 & n.4 (2014) (stating that applicants for tenure track law professor
jobs increasingly have earned a masters or doctorate in another field).
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* Everyone is publishing -from the student-edited law reviews,3 to
the (small number of) peer-reviewed journals, to bar association
outlets, to the blog established just yesterday.
* From one perspective, there are no restrictions on the intended au-
dience. Nevertheless, as a practical matter there is a hierarchy: first,
the peers of the writer (scholars write for other scholars, practition-
ers write for other practitioners, and journalists write for the pub-
lic); second, decision-makers; and third, the legal profession writ
large.
" Written works now reach audiences largely through computerized
databases on the Internet. This has had the effect of diluting the in-
fluence of the major law reviews, which used to have a shelf-space
advantage in law libraries. For the small number of peer-reviewed
journals, readers have some assurance of quality. Otherwise readers
are on their own, either with a student-edited journal or something
more entrepreneurial.
II. SCHOLARSHIP IN ACTION
This overview shows who is writing and who the authors hope are reading
their output. As I indicated at the outset, however, more often than not those
hopes are not realized. In order to test that hypothesis, I took a look at the
"published" (meaning precedential) output of the Seventh Circuit from August
2013 to August 2014. I recognize that this approach may miss certain ways in
which scholarship affects judges. For instance, judges might be reading articles
that they do not cite (just as they may spot interesting articles in the newspaper
or on their favorite blog). My hypothesis, however, is that the most influential
academic works will show up in opinions. In any event, tracking the invisible
ways in which scholarship affects outcomes without a good empirical survey of
the judges is quite difficult. In days gone by, one might have looked at each
judge's chambers library to see which law journals the judge regularly re-
viewed. Today, largely for budgetary reasons, printed copies of law reviews
have vanished from chambers' libraries and the judges rely exclusively on elec-
tronic databases. In addition, heavy dockets at both the state and federal level
38. For criticism of the dependence of the legal academy on this outlet since the sharp reduction
in doctrinal articles, see Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47
STAN. L. REv. 1132 (1995).
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leave little time for "personal-improvement" reading. This can be unfortunate,
when something of real interest comes along and the judge must settle for
skimming it. But that is reality. With those thoughts in mind, I turn now to
the results of my survey.
According to Westlaw, the Seventh Circuit issued 1,123 opinions between
August 1, 2013 (the earliest date on my list) and August 14, 2014 (the latest date
I have); of those, 669 were "reported" or "published," and 454 were "unreport-
ed" or nonprecedential' 9 Over that period, only seventy-six reported cases, or
11.4%, included one or more references to legal scholarship. (It is unlikely that
the percentage would do anything but go down if we searched the unreported
decisions for citations to scholarship.) The case with the greatest number of
references to scholarly articles was Korte v. Sebelius, which dealt with such con-
tentious questions as whether corporations have standing to attack the contra-
ception mandate in the Affordable Care Act, whether the mandate imposed a
substantial burden on religious exercise, and whether the government's show-
ing was sufficient to demonstrate the validity of the mandate.40 Perhaps, one
might think, scholarship is especially useful when cutting-edge, politically divi-
sive issues are presented in the case. More broadly, it is helpful to break down
the types of scholarship that appear in opinions.
Our own review of the articles cited in the opinions suggested seven differ-
ent types of legal scholarship that appeared. I present them here in order of
frequency: (1) doctrinal works that focus on a narrow issue (forty-two cases,
with eighty citations); (2) doctrinal works that survey an area (twenty-four
cases, with forty-two citations); (3) theoretical or interdisciplinary works
(eighteen cases, with twenty-six citations); (4) articles discussing legislative
history or those that include a critique of the law or a proposal for change (sev-
en cases, with nine citations); (5) articles presenting empirical research (six
cases, six citations); (6) articles discussing recent decisions of the U.S. Su-
preme Court (five cases, six citations); and (7) articles offering a comparative
legal perspective (three cases, four citations). These numbers are telling: judges
(or their law clerks) refer to articles that are most pertinent to the problem at
hand. More ambitious pieces -the theoretical, the empirical, or the compara-
tive - are used with greater caution.
That is not because theory, data from the world, and perspective on how
others do things are irrelevant to the law. But, particularly for first-instance
39. Westlaw has a standalone Seventh Circuit database, which is what we used to obtain these
numbers. It automatically excludes the Northern District of Illinois, the Supreme Court, and
the bankruptcy court. An Excel sheet that lists the case, citation, proposition, and article cit-
ed for the period covered appears as the Appendix.
40. 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013).
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and intermediate-level courts, such materials must be used with caution, with-
in the boundaries that the Constitution, legislation, and higher courts have de-
lineated. Law does matter, and it imposes constraints that genuinely bind
judges. No matter how well-reasoned a theoretical piece may be, or how com-
pelling the empirical evidence, or how wise another country's solution may ap-
pear, it is the task of U.S. judges to apply and interpret U.S. law. A judge
might comment on a rule whose time has come and gone, but the lower court
judge must nonetheless apply it.41 In some instances, however, the law invites
judges to consult empirical evidence. How, for instance, is a judge to decide
whether an advertising campaign or a debt-collection letter is misleading? Em-
pirical evidence might not be necessary, but surely it is relevant to this type of
question. Many U.S. laws also advert to foreign law: obvious examples include
the foreign tax credit,' but the reach of foreign law is also central to the adju-
dication of a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds,43 or a mo-
tion to stay proceedings in favor of a first-filed foreign proceeding that covers
the same ground, or a suit to obtain information for use in a foreign legal tri-
bunal.44
The overwhelming majority of the citations, however, are more immediate-
ly utilitarian. Looking now at citations rather than opinions that include a ref-
erence to scholarship, we see that there were 173 citations over the course of the
year in question, and that 122 of those (approximately 70%) were either "doc-
trinal/survey" references or "doctrinal/narrow issue" references. Considering
the volume of legal scholarship that pours out of America's more than 200 law
schools each year, most of which have several student-edited journals, this is a
poor showing. Not only does this informal survey suggest that the results of
legal scholarship seldom appear in judicial opinions, it also suggests that the
articles that are cited are those that fall at the lower end of the prestige scale
that is tacitly accepted in elite law schools. Judges may be reading the more
ambitious articles in their spare time, scarce though that often is, but they are
41. See, e.g., Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F. 3d 1358 (7 th Cir. 1996) (discussing the per se rule
against maximum price-fixing). The court was highly critical of the rule, but it stated openly
that only the Supreme Court could change things. And indeed, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in that very case and overruled the old rule. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3
(1997).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 493 U.S. 132 (1989) (deciding that
the issue of accumulated profits had to be assessed under U.S. principles, not British princi-
ples, in the application of the foreign tax credit to British earnings, but considering both
bodies of law).
43. See, e.g., Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007).
44. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004) (construing 28
U.S.C. § 1782 (2012) as it was used to collect information for a proceeding before the Direc-
torate-General for Competition of the European Union).
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turning for help in deciding cases to the doctrinal work that emerges from the
legal academy and that groups like the ALI and the bar produce, as our review
of citations revealed.
The final insight that comes from this snapshot of the Seventh Circuit may
allow this Feature to end on a more optimistic note. Judges vary greatly in their
willingness to include references to scholarship in their opinions. Looking at
the cases gathered in the Appendix and counting both majority opinions and
separate opinions, we see that Judge Posner referred to scholarly articles in
thirty-one different proceedings -by far the most of any judge on the court.
Judge Hamilton came in second, with references in ten opinions. I was third,
with nine; Judges Flaum, Easterbrook, Rovner, and Sykes each had five; Judg-
es Manion and Tinder had four, and Judge Kanne one. These numbers suggest
that even when a panel of three (or more) judges agrees on a particular result,
the reasons for each judge's decision will vary, and the types of materials that
individual judges discuss in their opinions are not uniform.
It would be a mistake, however, to make too much of a single year's docket.
Many cases decided by the federal courts of appeals involve straightforward
applications of the law, and there is no need to belabor the analysis with gratui-
tous citations. If in a given year a particular judge does not happen to be as-
signed to a panel with the kind of blockbuster case that invites references to le-
gal scholarship, then the judge will have no occasion to consult the law
reviews, or, for that matter, the ratification debates that led to the adoption of
the Constitution, or an eighteenth century dictionary.
For purposes of this discussion, as well as more generally, it is also vital to
bear in mind the distinct roles of trial court judges, intermediate appellate
judges, and judges or justices on courts of last resort.4' The role of legal schol-
arship and its potential utility are greater for courts of last resort, whether state
supreme courts or the United States Supreme Court.46 It is no accident that
many state supreme courts have looked to the ALI's Restatements of the Law
when they consider new questions of contract, tort, agency, property, or the
like. (They are not as likely to adopt some of the more abstract musings of legal
scholars, but that can hardly surprise the writers.) At its best, legal scholarship
rises above the details of any particular field of law and improves understand-
ing of our legal system as a whole. It can reveal similarities that have been hid-
den by the details of old doctrines or cases; it can sweep away irrelevancies and
45. See Diane P. Wood, When To Hold, When To Fold, and When To Reshuffle: The Art of Deci-
sionmaking on a Multi-Member Court, ioo CALIF. L. REV. 1445 (2012).
46. See Petherbridge & Schwartz, supra note 2; cf Schwartz & Petherbridge, supra note 2 (find-
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provide a clear rule of decision that benefits the community as a whole and the
lower court judges who must apply the law; it can reveal unintended inefficien-
cies or impositions that are inconsistent with fundamental constitutional prin-
ciples. Perhaps these advances inspire legislators to pass better laws; perhaps
they inspire Supreme Court Justices to look through old myths, like "separate
but equal," and realize that there is just one principle of equality; and perhaps
they allow other judges to explain their reasoning in a way that is clear, con-
sistent with binding rules, and compelling. Those are some of the goals to
which legal scholarship should aspire.
CONCLUSION
To the extent that legal scholarship can spark a new way of thinking about
law, and by fanning the flame become influential, it is worthwhile. But most of
those sparks, unfortunately, do not fall on judges. Professors in the legal acad-
emy write for their peers; they test hypotheses in workshops, work-in-progress
luncheons, exchange of papers for comment, and their experiences as teachers
in the classroom. Papers are commonly posted online before they take their fi-
nal form as articles. The content of those papers reaches some judges directly,
at least some of the time, but more often the influence is indirect -the invisible
role of scholarship that I discussed at the outset of this Feature. The judge may
remember one or more particularly influential professors from her own law
school experience and find those professors' approach to the law persuasive. Or
the judge, recalling days as a practicing lawyer, may understand the need for
imaginative thinking when a client's problem seems like a square peg being
hammered into a round hole, yet the lawyer (and later the judge) is persuaded
that the client should prevail. When legal scholarship subtly influences the way
that a brief is written, and the writer has taken care to respect the judge's insti-
tutional constraints, that scholarship may be very influential indeed. Judges are
also exposed on a daily basis to whatever scholarship contributed to the educa-
tion of their law clerks. Finally, if other judges are like me, they receive a con-
stant flow of article offprints and books from academics around the country
who are only too pleased to share their latest work product. I do not read every
word of every article or book that I receive, but I do take a look at all of them to
see what is being discussed, how well the piece is written, and whether it per-
tains either generally to what I do as an appellate judge or particularly to an ar-
ea that interests me.
Legal scholarship would go out of business if it were produced exclusively
for judges, but fortunately for those in the scholarship business, the audience is
not so limited. Even though a great deal of what is produced is too abstract to
be useful (although I have a quibble with the Chief Justice's criticism, since
Bulgaria did not exist as an independent state between the fourteenth and late
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nineteenth centuries), 47 one can never predict where basic research will go, in
law just as in the hard sciences. Judges are the indirect beneficiaries of that
basic thinking, and they are the direct beneficiaries of legal writing that is more
focused on either substantive doctrine or legal process. So write on, and we will
read what we can.
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APPENDIX: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN RECENT SEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECISIONS
Case Judge Proposition Article
520 S.
Michigan
Ave. Assocs. Cynthia L. Estlund, The
Ltd. v. Unite Tinder DoctrinaSurvey Ossification ofAmerican Labor
Here Local i, ey Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527
760 F. 3d 708 (2002)(7th Cir.
2014)
Archdiocese Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of
of Milwaukee the Objective Theory of Contract
v. Doe, 743 Sykes Doctrinal/Survey Formation and Interpretation, 69
F. 3d 1iOl ( 7th FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (2000)
Cir. 2014)
Scott M. Tyler, Note, No (Easy)
Way Out: "Liquidating"
Bider Inv. Posner Doctrinal/ Stipulated Damages for
Venture II v. Narrow Issue Contractor Delay in Public
Marathon Construction Contracts, 44 DUKE
Petrol. Co., L.J. 357 (1994)
74 1 F. 3d 832 Jedediah Purdy, The American
(7th Cir. Theory/ Transformation of Waste
2014) Posner teoiy/ Doctrine: A Pluralist
Interdisciplinary Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L.
REv. 653 (2006)
Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Pos-
Bryn Mawr ner, Shaming White-Collar
Care, Inc. v. Legislative Criminals: A Proposal for Reform
Sebelius, 749 Manion History/Critique of the Federal Sentencing Guide-




Areas Health Erin Murphy, Manufacturing
& Welfare Doctrinal/ Crime: Process, Pretext, and
Fund v. Posner Narrow Issue Criminal Justice, 97 GEO. L.J.
Lewis, 745 1435 (2009)
F. 3d 283 (7th
Cir. 2014)
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash,
Chasenksy v. The Appointment and Removal of
Walker, 740 Manion Doctrinal/ WilliamJ. Marbury and When
F. 3d io88 (7th Narrow Issue an Office Vests, 89 NOTRE DAME
Cir. 2014) L. REv. 199 (2013)
Coyomani- Recent Supreme Note, "How Clear is Clear" in
Cielo v. Flaum Court Chevron's Step One?, 118 HARV.
Holder, 758 L. REv. 1687 (2005)
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F. 3d 908 ( 7th
Cir. 2014)
Michael W. McConnell,
Ctr. for Accommodation of Religion: An
Inquiry, Inc. Easterbrook Doctrinal/Survey Update and a Response to the
v. Marion Critics, 6o GEo. WASH. L. REV.
Circuit Court 685 (1992)
Clerk, 758 Kent Greenawalt, Establishment
F.3d 869 ( 7th Clause Limits on Free Exercise
Cir. 2014) Easterbrook Doctrinal/Survey Accommodations, 11o W. VA. L.
REV. 343 (2007)
David L. Shapiro, Class Actions:
Posner Doctrinal/ The Class as Party and Client, 73




7S3 F. 3d 718(7th Cir.
2014)
Arthur R. Miller, Of
Doctrinal/ Frankenstein Monsters and Shin-Posner Narrow Issue ing Knights: Myth, Reality, and
the "Class Action Problem," 92
HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979)
Doctrinal/ Robert H. Klonoff, The DeclineNarrow Issue of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 729 (2013)
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'
Theory/ Attorney's Role in Class Action
Posner Iteo r y and Derivative Litigation:
Interdisciplinary Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991)
John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking
Posner Doctrinal/Survey the Class Action: A Policy Primer
on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625
(1987)
Note, Developments in the Law-
Posner Doctrinal/Survey Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1318 (1976)
Posner Empirical
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey
Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs
and Objectors in Class Action Lit-
igation: Theoretical and Empirical
Issues, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1529
(2004)
Lucia A. Silecchia, The Catalyst
Frey v. EPA, Calamity: Post-Buckhannon
751 F. 3d 461 Hamilton Recent Supreme Fee-Shifting in Environmental
(7th Cit. Court Litigation and a Proposalfor
2014) Congressional Action, 29 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2004)
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Wabash Ven- Evidence and the Confrontation
ture LLC, 755 Clause After Crawford v. Wash-
F. 3d 4 56 (7 th ington, 15 BROOK. J.L. & POL'Y
Cir. 2014) 791 (2007)
David L. Faigman, Expert
Doctrinal/ Evidence in Flatland: The Geom-Narrow Issue etty of a World Without Scientific
Culture, 34 SETON HALL L. REV.
255 (2003)
John F. Manning, What DividesPosner Theory/ Textualists from Purposivists?,
Interdisciplinary io6 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006)
Peter S. Kim, Navigating the
Grede v. Safe Harbors: Two Bright Line
FCS tone, Legislative Rules To Assist Courts in
24G, 746 F.3d Hamilton History/Critique Applying the Stockbroker Defense
204 (7th Cir. and the Good Faith Defense, 2008
2014) COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 657
Halperin v. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
Halperin, 750 Posner R. Fischel, Close Corporations
F. 3d 668 (7 th DoctrinaSurvey and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L.
Cir. 2014) REV. 271 (1986)
Jeremiah R. Newhall, Sex-Based
Kovner Doctrinal/ Dress Codes and Equal Protection
Hayden v. Narrow Issue in Public Schools, 12 APPALACHI-
Greensburg ANJ.L. 209 (2013)
Cmty. Sch. Jennifer L. Greenblatt, Using the
Corp., 743 Equal Protection Clause Post-
F. 3d 569 (7 th Rovner Doctrinal/ VMI To Keep Gender Stereotypes
Cir. 2014) Narrow Issue Out of the Public School Dress
Code Equation, 13 U.C. DAVIS J.
Juv. L. & POL'Y 281 (2009)
Michael C. Harper, The Casefor
Heartland Posner Doctrinal/ Limiting Judicial Review of Labor
Human Servs. Narrow Issue Board Certification Decisions, 55
v. NLRB, 746 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262 (1987)
F 3d 802 (7 th DoM. Elizabeth Magill, Agency
Cir. 2014) Posner Doctrinal! Choice ofPolicymaking Form, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004)
Andrew Kull, Restitution in
In re Miss. Doctrinal/ Bankruptcy: Reclamation and
Valley Wood Narrow Issue Constructive Trust, 72 AM.
Livestock, BANKR. L.J. 265 (1998)
299 7 .Doctrinal Emily L. Sherwin, Constructive2 (7thi Wood Narrow Issue Trusts in Bankruptcy, 1989 U.
2014) WILL. L. REV. 297.





Karen M. Blum & John J. Ryan,
Recent Developments in the Use of
Excessive Force by Law
Enforcement, 24 TouRo L. REv.
569 (2008)
Irene M. Baker, Wilson v.
Spain: Will Pretrial Detainees
Escape the Constitutional
"Twilight Zone"?, 75 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 449 (2001)
Nicolas Marie Kublicki, An
Overview of the French Legal
Klinger v. Posner Comparative System from an American
Conan Doyle Perspective, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 57
Estate, Ltd., (1994)
755 F. 3d 496 Leslie A. Kurtz, The Methuselah
(7th Cir. al/ Factor: When Characters Outlive2014) Posner DoctrinalerCoyiht,1/U imNarrow Issue Their Copyrights, 11 U. MIAMI
ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 437
(1994)
Michael J. Meurer, Controlling
Klinger v. Posner Doctrinal/ Opportunistic and Anti-
Conan Doyle Narrow Issue Competitive Intellectual Property
Estate, Ltd., Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509
761 F. 3d 789 (2003)(7th Cir. Ben Depoorter & Robert Kirk
2014) Posner Doctrinal/ Walker, Copyright False Posi-
Narrow Issue tives, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
319 (2013)
Laborers Martin H. Malin, Does Public
Local 236 v. Theory/ Employee Collective Bargaining
Walker, 749 Flaum teory Distort Democracy? A Perspective
F.3d 628 (7th Interdisciplinary from the United States, 34 COMP.
Cir. 2014) LAB. L. & POL'YJ. 277 (2013)
Lightspeed Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Chal-
v. Smith, 761 Wood Legislative lenges to the Computer Fraud andF.3d 699 (7 th History/Critique Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REv.
Cit. 2014)151200
Matthew C. Stephenson, The
Price of Public Action:
Markadonatos Posner DConstitutional Doctrine and the
v. Village of (concurring) Judicial Manipulation of
Woodbridge, Legislative Enactment Costs, 118
760 F. 3d 54 5  YALE L.J. 2 (2008)(7th Cir. Frank H. Easterbrook, Do
2014) Hamilton Liberals and Conservatives Differ
(dissenting) Doctrinal/Survey in Judicial Activism?, 73 U. CO-
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Richard A. Posner, Statutory
Hamilton Doctrinal/Survey Interpretation -in the Classroom
(dissenting) and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI.
L. REv. 8oo (1983)
Michael L. Eber, When the Dis-
Doctrinal/ sent Creates the Law:
Hamilton DoIssue Cross-Cutting Majorities and the
(dissenting) Narrow Issue Prediction Model of Precedent, 58
EMoRYL.J. 207 (2008)
Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of
Wood Doctrinal/Survey Erie - and of the New FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
Michigan v. REV. 383 (1964)
U.S. Army William L. Prosser, Private Ac-
Corps of Wood Doctrinal/Survey tion for Public Nuisance, 52 VA.
Eng'rs, 758 L. REv. 997 (1966)F.3d 89 2 (Tth
Cir. 2014) David Freeman Engstrom,
Wood Doctrinal/Survey Agencies as LitigationGatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616
(2013)
Luz E. Nagle, Colombian Asylum
Seekers and What Practitioners
Rovner Theory Should Know About the Colombi-
N.L.A.Interdisciplinary an Crisis, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
Holder, 744 441 (2004)
F.3d 425 (7 th United Nations High Comm'r
Cir. 2014) Theory/ for Refugees, International Pro-
Rovner teory tection Considerations Regarding
Interdisciplinary Colombian Asylum Seekers, 15
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 318 (2003)
David L. Shapiro, Federal Diver-
Posner Doctrinal/Survey sity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a
Parmalat Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317
Capital Fin. (1977)
Ltd. v. Grant Henry J. Friendly, The Historic
Thornton Posner Doctrinal/Survey Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41
Int'l, 756 F.3d HARv. L. REV. 483 (1928)
549 (7th Cir. Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction
2014) Posner Doctrinal/ and Procedure Under the Bank-
Narrow Issue ruptcy Amendments of1984, 38
VAND. L. REV. 675 (1985)
Pennington v. Note, Creditor's Liability for
ZionSolutions Doctrinal/ Mismanagement of Debtor
LLC, 742 F.3d Posner Narrow Issue Corporation, 47 YALE L.J. lOO9
715 (7th Cir. (1938)
2014)
Shields v. Ill. Jack M. Beermann, Municipal
Dep't of Hamilton Doctrinal/Survey Responsibility for Constitutional
Corr., 746 Torts, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 627
F. 3d 782 (1999)
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Peter H. Schuck, Municipal
Liability Under Section 1983:
Some Lessons from Tort Law and
Organization Theory, 77 GEO.
L.J. 1753 (1989)
Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes,
Hamilton Theory/ Municipal Liability Under SectionInterdisciplinary 1983: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 1987 SuP. CT. REV.
249
Susanah M. Mead, 42 U.S.C.
5 1983 Municipal Liability: The
Hamilton Doctrinal/Survey Monell Sketch Becomes a Distort-
ed Picture, 65 N.C.L. REV. 517
(1987)
Karen M. Blum, From Monroe
to Monell: Defining the Scope of
Hamilton Doctrinal/Survey Municipal Liability in Federal
Courts, 51 TEMP. L.Q4o9
(1978)
Jack M. Beermann, A Critical
Hamilton Theory/ Approach to Section 1983 withInterdisciplinary Special Attention to Sources of
Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1989)
Richard Frankel, Regulating
Hamilton Doctrinal/ Privatized Government Through
Narrow Issue 5 1983, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449
(2009)
Barbara Kritchevsky, Civil
Hamilton Doctrinal/ Rights Liability of PrivateNarrow Issue Entities, 26 CARDozo L. REV. 35
(2004)
Hamilton Doctrinal/Narrow Issue
Jack M. Beermann, Why Do
Plaintiffs Sue Private Parties
Under Section 1983?, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 9 (2004)
Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal
Sykes Doctrinal/Survey Regulation of State Court
(concurring) Procedures, 11o YALE L.J. 947
Suesz v. (2001)
Med-i Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth
Solutions, Sykes Doctrinal/Survey Preemption: The Proposed Feder-LLC, 757 F.3d (concurring) alization of State Court Proce-636 (7th Cit. dures, 44 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1999)
2014) Frank H. Easterbrook, Text,










Caretaking? A Solution to the
Overbroad Expansion of the
Inventory Search, 22 GEO. MA-
SON U. C.R. L.J. 249 (2012)
Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police
Paternalism: Community
Rovner Doctrinal/ Caretaking, Assistance Searches,
Narrow Issue and Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1485 (2009)
Rovner Doctrinal/ Deborah Tuerkheimer, Exigen-
Narrow Issue cY, 49 ARIz. L. REV. 8oi (2007)
Mary Elizabeth Naumann,
Doctrinal/ Note, The Community CaretakerRovner NDoctrine: Yet Another FourthAmendment Exception, 26 AM. J.
CluM. L. 325 (1999)
Gregory T. Helding, Comment,
Stop Hammering Fourth
Doctrinal/ Amendment Rights: ReshapingRovner Narrow Issue the Community CaretakingException With the Physical
Intrusion Standard, 97 MARQ.L.
REv. 123 (2013)
Debra Livingston, Police,
Rovner Doctrinal/ Community Caretaking, and the
Narrow Issue Fourth Amendment, 1998 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 261
John L. Schwab & Thomas G.
Sprankling, Houston, We Have a
Problem: Does the Second
Amendment Create a Property







Jana R. McCreary, "Mentally
Defective" Language in the Gun
Control Act, 45 CONN. L. REv.
81 (2o1 )
Laura A. Napoli, Demystifying
United States "Pornography": Tailoring Special
v. Adkins, 743 Flaum Doctrinal/ Release Conditions Concerning
F. 3d 176 ( 7th Narrow Issue Pornography and Sexually
Cir. 2014) Oriented Expression, 11 U.N.H.

























Douglas D. McFarland, Present
Sense Impressions Cannot Live in
the Past, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
907 (2001)
Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter,
and the Uncertain Future of Pre-
sent Sense Impressions, 16o U.
PA. L. REV. 331 (2012)
Jon. R. Waltz, The Present Sense
Impression Exception to the Rule
Against Hearsay: Origins and
Attributes, 66 IOWAL. REv. 869
(1981)
I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., Perception,
Memory, and Hearsay: A
Criticism of Present Law and the
Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 1
Robert M. Hutchins & Donald
Slesinger, Some Observations on
the Law of Evidence: Spontaneous
Exclamations, 28 COLUM. L.
REV. 432 (1928)
Franklin Strier, The Educated
Posner Doctrinal/ Jury: A Proposal for ComplexNarrow Issue Litigation, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
49 (1997)
United States Note, Developments in the Law -
v. Farano, 7 Posner Doctrinal/Survey III. Jury Selection and Composi-
F.3 d 658 (7 th tion, 11o HA v. L. REv. 1443
Cir. 2014) (1997)
Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary
Posner Doctrinal/Survey Excesses in the American Crimi-
nal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 403 (1992)
United States Rorie A. Norton, Note, Matters
v. Hernandez, Doctrinal/ ofPublic Safety and the Current
751 F3d 538 Manion Issue arrel over the Scope of the
(7th Cir. e Quarles Exception to Miranda, 78
2014) FORDHAM L. REV. 1931 (2010)
Maggie Muething, Note, Inac-
United States tive Distribution: How the Federal
v. McGill, Doctrinal/ Sentencing Guidelines forF.3d 452 (7 th Rovner Distribution of Child PornographyRovner Narrow Issue Fail To Effectively Account for
Cir. 2014) Peer-to-Peer Networks, 73 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1485 (2012)
United States Doctrinal/ Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges
v. Thomas, Wood Narrow Issue Should Admit Expert Testimony




F.3d 79 2 (7 th
Cir. 2014)
124:2592 2015
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP FOR JUDGES
(7 th Cir. Testimony, 2006 FED. CTS. L.
2014) REV. 3
United States Michelle S. Phelps, Rehabilita-
v. Williams, Theory/ tion in the Punitive Era: The Gap739 F3d 1o64 Posner Tery! Between Rhetoric and Reality in(7th C 064 Interdisciplinary U.S. Prison Programs, 45 LAW &
2014) SOC'YREV. 33 (2o11)
Univ. of
Notre Dame Michael W. McConnell, Free
v. Sebelius, Flaum Recent Supreme Exercise Revisionism and the
743 F. 3 d 547 (dissenting) Court Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
(7th Cir. REV. 1109 (1990)
2014)
Velisquez- Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and
Garcia v. Loathing in Congress and the
Holder, 760 Wood Doctrinal/Survey Courts: Immigration and Judicial
F.3d 571 (7th Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615
Cir. 2014) (2000)
Paul J. Donahue, Plan Sponsor
Abbott v. Fiduciary Duty for the Selection of
Martioc od Doctrinal/ Options in Participant-Directed
Martin Corp., Wood Narrow Issue Defined Contribution Plans and
725 F3d 803 the Choice Between Stable Value
( 7th Cir. 2013) and Money Market, 39 AKRON L.
REV. 9 (2006)
Balthazar v. Bethany K. Dumas, jury Trials:
City of Doctrinal/ Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury
Chicago, 73S Posner Narrow Issue Instructions, and Comprehension
F. 3d 634 (7 th Issues, 67 TENN. L. REV. 701
Cir. 2013) (2000)
Robert D. Brain & Daniel J.
Baugh v. Broderick, The Derivative
Cuprum S.A. Doctrinal/ Relevance of Demonstrative
d CV. (70 HNarrow Issue Evidence: Charting Its Proper
F.3d8Ol (7 th Evidentiary Status, 25 U.C.
Cir. 2013) DAvIS. L. REV. 957 (1992)
Carajeski v. Note, The Unclaimed Personal
Zoeller, 735 Posner Legislative Property Problem: A Legislative
F. 3d 577 ( 7th History/Critique Proposal, 19 STAN. L. REV. 619
Cir. 2013) (1967)
Currie v. Catherine T. Struve, The Condi-
Chhabra, 728 Wood Doctrinal/ tions ofPretriaI Detention, 161 U.
F. 3d 626 (7th Narrow Issue PENN. L. REV. loO n (213)
Cir. 2013)
Richard Scott Carnell, Handling
DeKalb Cnty. Doctrinal/ the Failure of a Government-
v.Fed. Posner Narrow Issue Sponsored Enterprise, 8o WASH.
Housing Fin. L. REv. 565 (2005)
Agency, 741 Erik M. Jensen, The Apportion-
F.3d 795 (7th Posner Doctrinal/ ment of 'Direct Taxes': Are
Cit. 2013) Narrow Issue Consumption Taxes
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Theory/
Interdisciplinary
Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 2334 (1997)
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958)
E.E.O.C. v. Neal Devins, Political Will and
Mach Mining the Unitary Executive: What
LLC, 738 F.3d Hamilton Doctrinal/Survey Makes an Independent Agency
171 (7th Cir. Independent?, 15 CARDozo L.
2013) REV. 273 (1993)
Garcia v.
Colvin, 741 Posner Doctrinal/ George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as
F. 3d 758 (7 th Narrow Issue Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575
Cir. 2013) (1997)
Richard A. Zitrin, The Laudable
Posner Doctrinal/ South Carolina Court Rules Must
Narrow Issue Be Broadened, 55 S.C. L. REv.
883 (2004)
Scott A. Moss, Illuminating
Posner Theory/ Secrecy: A New Economic Analy-Interdisciplinary sis of Confidential Settlements, 1O5
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